This paper proposes a set of models which can be used to estimate the market risk for a portfolio of crypto-currencies, and simultaneously to estimate also their credit risk using the Zero Price Probability (ZPP) model by , which is a methodology to compute the probabilities of default using only market prices. For this purpose, both univariate and multivariate models with different specifications are employed. Two special cases of the ZPP with closed-form formulas in case of normally distributed errors are also developed using recent results from barrier option theory. A backtesting exercise using two datasets of 5 and 15 coins for market risk forecasting and a dataset of 42 coins for credit risk forecasting was performed. The Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall for single coins and for an equally weighted portfolio were calculated and evaluated with several tests. The ZPP approach was used for the estimation of the probability of default/death of the single coins and compared to classical credit scoring models (logit and probit) and to a machine learning algorithm (Random Forest). Our results reveal the superiority of the t-copula/skewed-t GARCH model for market risk, and the ZPP-based models for credit risk.
minimum value in the 30 days prior to the candidate peak, and if its value is at least 5% as large as the cryptocurrency's maximum peak. Given these peak data, Feder et al. (2018) consider a coin abandoned (= dead), if the daily average volume for a given month is less than or equal to 1% of the peak volume.
Besides, if the average daily trading volume for a month following a peak is greater than 10% of the peak value and that currency is currently abandoned, then Feder et al. (2018) change the coin status to resurrected.
Despite the differences in these criteria, they have one thing in common: the "death" state is not a permanent state and a dead coin can be revamped/revived, even several times during a relatively short period. For example, Feder et al. (2018) found that 44% of publicly traded coins are subsequently abandoned (18% permanently), while 85% of announced coins fail before being traded publicly. Moreover, they also found that most coins are not traded much, and these coins are more likely to die than their larger counterparts are. Interestingly, they showed that some coins could be revamped up to five times over a 5-year period.
Given this background, credit risk for cryptocurrencies can be defined as the gains and losses on the value of a position of a cryptocurrency that is abandoned and considered dead according to professional and/or academic criteria, but which can be potentially revived and revamped 6 .
Substantially, the differences between credit and market risk in case of cryptocurrencies are of quantitative and temporal nature, not qualitative: if the financial losses and the technical problems can be dealt with the available financial and technical resources, then we have a market event. If the financial losses are too big and the technical problems cannot be solved, then we have a credit event and the cryptocurrency "dies". Moreover, it follows easily that the longer the time horizon, the more probable are large losses and/or technical problems and/or hacking attacks on the cryptocurrency blockchain, so credit risk becomes more important. Note that this latter result is already known in the classical financial literature, given that ". . . the ratio of default and (normally distributed) market risk losses is proportional to the square-root of the holding period. Since the ratio goes to 0 as the holding period goes to 0, over short horizons market risk is relatively more important, while over longer horizons losses due to default become more important"(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), p. [16] [17] .
Once a credit event takes place, the development of a cryptocurrency stops, its price falls close to zero (or even to zero, if we consider the uninterrupted lack of trading for several days and weeks as evidence of a zero price 7 ), but trading may still continue for the reasons discussed in the introduction. At a first glance, this situation may be similar to the so-called "zombie firms": these firms are characterized by 6 In this paper, we deal only with the credit risk arising from the death of a cryptocurrency. The credit risk due to the possibility that a crypto-exchange is hacked and/or goes bankrupt is examined by Moore and Christin (2013) and Moore et al. (2018) . 7 Crypto-exchanges work 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
6 a lack of profitability over an extended period, are rather old and their future expected profitability is rather low. There are no unique criteria to define a zombie firm but, in general, the ability to barely repay the interest on its debts coupled with the inability to repay the principal are common to several criteria proposed in the literature, see Caballero et al. (2008) , Adalet et al. (2018) and Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) . However, a dead cryptocurrency is a rather different phenomenon from a zombie firm:
there is no financial institution providing financial support to continue the project, and the trading of the coin can continue even without any project development. Instead, a zombie firm is kept alive to guarantee that the firm continues its activities, thus saving jobs places.
Given the importance of the zero price barrier to determine the death of a cryptocurrencies, it would be natural to consider reduced-form and hybrid credit risk models in which the asset price jumps to zero at default: see, for example, Linetsky (2006) , Carr and Linetsky (2006) , Campi et al. (2009) , Das and Hanouna (2009) , Carr and Wu (2009) , Bayraktar and Yang (2011) and Dyrssen et al. (2014) .
Unfortunately, all these models are based on derivatives data, bond data and/or accounting data, which are not available for cryptocurrencies 8 . This is why a different approach based only on market data is required.
Finally, Table 1 summarizes the main aspects of credit and market risk for cryptocurrencies 9 .
Market risk Credit risk Definition Gains and losses on the value of a position or portfolio of alive cryptocurrencies, that can take place due to the movements in market prices in centralized and decentralized exchanges.
Gains and losses on the value of a position of a cryptocurrency that is abandoned and considered dead according to professional and/or academic criteria.
Differences from traditional finance
• Lack of financial oversight means that coins prices can be susceptible to manipulations, pump and dump schemes and other market frauds;
• Lack of regulatory oversight also explain why prices can differ widely across exchanges;
• Cryptocurrency exchanges do not provide neither cash nor asset insurance (but there are exceptions).
• Dead coins can be revamped several times; • Dead coins are very different from "zombie firms";
• Traditional credit risk models cannot be used due to the (current) lack of derivatives data, bond data and/or accounting data. Table 1 : Main aspects of credit and market risk for cryptocurrencies 8 The CME and the CBOT introduced the first futures on bitcoin in December 2017, whereas options on cryptocurrencies are (currently) traded only on small and illiquid exchanges, with poor or no financial oversight.
9 Updated lists of dead coins can be found at https://deadcoins.com, www.coinopsy.com/dead-coins. The first site employs a broad definition of dead coins, whereas the second site has stricter selection criteria.
Methods: Market and Credit risk models
We first briefly review the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES), as well as a set of statistical tests to measure the goodness-of-fit of these market risk measures from different models after a backtesting exercise 10 . Similarly, we will present several methods to compute the probability of death for a crypto-coin to measure its credit risk, as well as several metrics to evaluate the estimated death probabilities. Two special cases of the ZPP with closed-form formulas in case of normally distributed asset returns will be developed using recent results from barrier option theory. The multivariate time series models used to simultaneously estimate the market and credit risk for a portfolio of crypto-currencies are discussed in Appendix B.
Market Risk
Market risk arises due to movement in market variables − asset prices, interest rates, FX rates, or in our case − cryptocurrencies prices. In this work, we consider two measures of market risk: the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES).
Value-at-Risk. The Value at Risk at level α (VaR α ) is the minimum loss of the α worst losses an investor can expect to lose over a specific period of time. More formally, if we call ∆W (l) the change in the portfolio value from time t to t + l and F l (x) the cumulative distribution function ("cdf") of ∆W t+l , the VaR of a long position over the time horizon l with probability α can be defined as follows:
where VaR is defined as a negative value (loss), even though a part of the financial literature defines it as a positive value, see e.g. Jorion (2006) and Christoffersen (2011) . If the cdf is known, then the VaR is its α-quantile times the value of the financial position. The previous definition of the VaR continues to apply to a short position if one uses the distribution of −∆W (l), see Jorion (2007) for more details.
If we consider the profit and losses (P&L) for a single coin or for a portolio of crypto-currencies and the normal distribution is used, then the VaR α,t+l is given by
α is the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution, µ t+l is the forecasted mean of the P&L distribution at time t + l, and σ t+l is the forecasted standard deviation of the P&L distribution at time t + l. If the Student's t distribution is used, then the VaR α,t+l is given by
where s t+l is the scale parameter of the Student's t distribution at time t+l given by s t+l = σ t+l (ν − 2)/ν, while t −1 α,ν is the α-quantile of the Student's t distribution with ν degrees of freedom. If copula models are used, simulation methods have to be implemented, see Fantazzini (2008) Backtesting methods for the Value at Risk. For backtesting purposes, it is common practice to split the dataset into two parts (training set and testing set), and to perform a rolling window estimation to compute at each time step the forecasted V aR α,t+l at the desired time horizon l and probability level α. The VaR forecasts and the actual realized series are then compared using the following back-testing techniques:
• Kupiec (1995) 's unconditional coverage test;
• Christoffersen (1998) 's conditional coverage test;
• Loss functions to evaluate VaR forecasts accuracy and to select the best models among a group of competing models using the model confidence set by Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2011) .
The Kupiec's test (also known as the Unconditional Coverage test) tests the difference between the observed and the expected number of VaR violations. Since the VaR is based on a confidence level α, when we observe T 1 actual exceedances out of T observations (with T = T 0 + T 1 and T 0 the number of no VaR violations), we observe an empirical frequency ofπ = T 1 /T proportion of excessive losses. The
Kupiec's test checks whetherπ is statistically significantly different from α. It is possible to show that the test of the null hypothesis H 0 :π = α is given by the following likelihood ratio test statistic, see Kupiec (1995) for details:
Christoffersen (1998) developed a likelihood ratio statistic to test the joint assumption of unconditional coverage and independence of VaR exceedances. The main advantage of this test named the Conditional Coverage test is that it can reject a VaR model that forecasts either too many or too few clustered exceedances, while its main limit is the need of (at least) several hundred observations to be accurate.
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The test statistic is computed as follows:
where T ij is the number of observations with value i followed by j for i, j = 0, 1 and
are the corresponding probabilities.
Loss functions are useful tools to compare the costs of different admissible choices. We will use the asymmetric VaR loss function proposed by Gonzalez-Rivera et al. (2004) , which penalizes more heavily the realized losses below the α-th quantile level, that is y t+l < V aR α,t+l :
where d α t+l = 1(y t+l < V aR α,t+l ) is the indicator function for the VaR exceedances. This loss function will be used for the Model Confidence Set (MCS) by Hansen et al. (2011) to select the best forecasting models among a set of competing models, given a specified confidence level. The MCS approach is an iterative procedure which consists of a test for the null hypothesis of equal predictive ability and an elimination rule: at each iteration, an equivalence test is performed to check if all models in the set of forecasting models M = M 0 have an equal forecasting accuracy by testing the following null hypothesis for a given confidence level 1 − β:
t is the sample loss differential between forecasting models i and j and L i,t stands for the loss function of model i at time t. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then M * 1−β = M . If the null hypothesis is rejected, the elimination rule e M is used to remove the worst forecasting models from the set M . The procedure is repeated until the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the final set of models define the so-called model confidence set M * 1−β . Hansen et al. (2011) propose different equivalence tests and we discuss here the T-max statistic which we used in the paper. First, the following t-statistics are computed:
where d i· = m −1 j∈Md ij is the simple loss of the i-th model relative to the average losses across models in the set M , and d ij = T −1 T t=1 d ij,t measures the sample loss differential between model i and j. Then, the T-max statistic is computed as T max = max i∈M (t i· ). The distribution of this test statistic is non-standard and is estimated using bootstrapping methods, see Hansen et al. (2011) for details. The elimination rule for the T-max statistic is e max,M = arg max i∈M d i· / var(d i· ) .
Expected Shortfall. The Expected Shortfall (ES) measures the average of the worst α losses, where α is a percentile of the P&L distribution. More formally, the expected shortfall at probability level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined as
where F −1 is the inverse function of the cdf of the P&L, which is the Value-at-Risk.
If the normal distribution is used, then the ES α,t+l is given by,
where φ(·) denotes the standard normal density function. Instead, if the Student's t distribution is employed, then the ES α,t+l is given by
where t ν is the density function of the Student's t distribution with ν degrees of freedom. If copula models are used, similarly to the case of the VaR, simulation methods have to be implemented.
Backtesting methods for the Expected Shortfall. Backtesting the ES is an active field of research since the work of McNeil and Frey (2000) , but it has become a very hot topic after Gneiting (2011) showed that ES lacks a mathematical property called elicitability (while VaR does have it), so that it may not be backtested 11 . However, Acerbi and Szekely (2014) showed that the ES can be back-tested and that the property of elicitability is useful only for model selection to choose the best model among a set of competitors. Moreover, Emmer et al. (2015) showed that the ES is elicitable conditionally on the VaR, and that it can be backtested through the approximation of several VaR levels: Kratz et al. (2018) used this latter approach for an empirical application. In this paper, we will use the tests by McNeil and Frey (2000) and by Kratz et al. (2018) . McNeil and Frey (2000) proposed a one-sided test based on the Exceedance Residuals (ER) that exceed the VaR, that is (2000) implement the standardized version of this test, where the exceedance residuals are standardized by the forecasted volatility (that is, ER t+l /σ t+l ). The null hypothesis is that the expected value of the standardized ER is zero against the alternative that the residuals have mean greater than zero, i.e. the expected shortfall is underestimated,
The distribution of this test is computed using the bootstrap method by Efron and Tibshirani (1994) p. 224. Kratz et al. (2018) proposed a multilevel VaR backtest to implicitly backtest the expected shortfall using the initial idea by Emmer et al. (2015) , who showed that
where q(γ) = V aR γ . For example, if α = 0.05 then
An estimated ES α can be considered reliable if the estimates of the four VaR values obtained from the same model are reliable. In the general case, Kratz et al. (2018) consider VaR probability levels α 1 , . . . , α N defined by
for some starting level α. Kratz et al. (2018) suppose to have a set of V aR α,t and ES α,t forecasts and a series of ex-post losses {L t , t = 1, . . . , T }. If I t,j = 1 (Lt>V aRα j ,t ) is the usual indicator function for a VaR violation at the level α j and X t = N j=1 I t,j , then the sequence (X t ) t=1,...,T counts the number of VaR levels that were breached. If we define M N (T, (p 0 , . . . , p N )) as the multinomial distribution with T trials, each of which may result in one of N + 1 outcomes {0, 1, . . . , N } according to probabilities p 0 , . . . , p N that sum to one, while the observed cell counts are defined by
I (Xt=j) , j = 0, 1, . . . , N then, under the assumptions of unconditional coverage and independence as in Christoffersen (1998) , the random vector (O 0 , . . . , O N ) should follow the multinomial distribution (O 0 , . . . , O N ) ∼ M N (T, (α 1 − α 0 , . . . , α N +1 − α N )) . Assuming the multinomial distribution estimated from the data is M N (T, (θ 1 − θ 0 , . . . , θ N +1 − θ N )), Kratz et al. (2018) test the following null and alternative hypotheses:
Several test statistics have been proposed in the statistical literature to test the previous hypotheses: Cai and Krishnamoorthy (2006) performed a large simulations study to verify the exact size and power properties of five possible tests, while Kratz et al. (2018) employed three of these five tests. We will employ the exact method which is the fifth test statistic reviewed by Cai and Krishnamoorthy (2006) , which computes the probability of a given outcome under the null hypothesis using the multinomial probability distribution itself: and Krishnamoorthy (2006) found out that the exact method performs very well, but it can be time-consuming if the number of cells and the sample size T are large. In this latter case, simulation methods can be used to decrease the computational burden 12 .
Credit Risk
In traditional finance, credit risk is the risk of a change in the value of positions associated with an unexpected deterioration in their credit quality, either downgrade or default. In the case of cryptocurrencies, as we previously discussed in section 3, credit risk is the risk of an extreme drop in the coin price following its "death", due to the discovery of a scam or a hacker attack or for other reasons. In this work, we will use the Probability of Default (PD) as the main measure of credit risk. However, when dealing with cryptocurrencies, this probability is usually referred to as the probability of death of the coin i, over a period of time t+T, given that it is alive at the time t:
Several approaches will be considered to estimate this probability using only available data, namely credit scoring models and the Zero Price Probability by Fantazzini, De Giuli, and Maggi (2008) . We want to emphasize that structural models, like the well known Merton and KMV models, cannot be used because they require accounting data which are not available for cryptocurrencies. Similary to traditional credit risk, we will consider a 1-year time horizon.
Scoring models. Scoring models use statistical techniques to combine different factors into a quantitative score which is used to compute the probability of default, see Mester (1997) , Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) , Rodriguez and Rodriguez (2006) , Altman and Sabato (2007) , Fantazzini and Figini (2008) and Fantazzini and Figini (2009) . Credit scoring models can be applied even if ratings and accounting data are not available. Several scoring models typically take the following form:
In case of a logit model, F (β ′ X i,t ) is given by the logistic cdf,
We can also employ machine learning algorithms for solving classification tasks with two classes (dead coin/alive coin): in this work, we will use the Random Forest algorithm proposed by Ho (1995) and Breiman (2001) . A Random Forest is an ensemble method using a large number of decision trees, where a decision tree is an instrument for decision making with the structure of a tree, i.e. it has branches and leaves. Each branch includes attributes which separate the alternative cases and following the tree through the branches, we end with a (pre-specified) value of an objective function. In case of a classification problem, each leave places an object either in one class or in the competing one. A single decision tree may provide a poor classification and can suffer from over-fitting and model instability: this is why the Random Forest algorithm is commonly used. Such an approach has multiple advantages: it is not sensitive to monotone transformations, it can cope with datasets with a large number of features and classes, and it can be used with continuous variables. See Friedman et al. (2016) and Smith and Koning (2017) for more details about decision trees and random forests.
The Zero Price Probability (ZPP). The Zero Price Probability was firstly introduced in Fantazzini et al. (2008) and relies on the fact that the PD can be estimated by computing the market-implied probability P(P τ ≤ 0) with t < τ ≤ t + T . Because for a stock price (or a coin price) P τ is a truncated variable and cannot become less than zero, the Zero-Price Probability is the probability that P τ goes below the truncation level of zero. discussed in details why the null price can be used as a default barrier.
A general estimation procedure of the ZPP for multivariate time series is reported below:
1. Consider a generic conditional model for the differences of prices levels X t = P t − P t−1 without the log-transformation:
where µ t is a vector of conditional means, D t = diag(σ 1,t , . . . , σ n,t ) a diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations, while z t is a vector of standardized errors with a conditional joint distribution given by H t , which can be any of those discussed in Section 3.1 .
2. Simulate a high number N of price trajectories up to time t + T , using the estimated time series model (3) at step 1. We will compute the 1-year ahead probability of death for each coin using T = 365 days, given that crypto-assets are traded every day of the week (whereas T = 250 would be used in the case of traditional financial assets).
3. The probability of default/death for a crypto-coin i is simply the ratio n/N , where n is the number of times out of N when the simulated price P k τ,i touched or crossed the zero barrier along the simulated trajectory:
It follows easily from (1) that the models used in section 3.1 for measuring market risk can also be used for measuring credit risk.
A special case: ZPP with normally distributed price differences. The original method proposed in dealt with general univariate models, where the ZPP can be estimated using only simulation methods. However, if we assume that the price differences are normally distributed and we use some recent theoretical results from barrier option theory, then it is possible to compute the ZPP using a closed-form solution.
Su and Rieger (2009) (Theorem 2.2) showed that if a stock price S t follows a standard Brownian motion, then the ratio of the probability that the asset hits a barrier H ∈ [0, ∞) before the maturity T and the probability that the asset is below the barrier at maturity T is equal to 2 :
where τ is the first t when the underlying asset price touches the barrier H, that is min 0≤t≤T {t|S t ≤ H}.
If the asset follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift, they showed that the ratio of the previous two probabilities is not constant anymore, but for H → 0 it still converges to 2 (see Su and Rieger (2009) ,
Using these theoretical results and assuming that the coin price differences X t = P t − P t−1 are normally distributed, we can find the closed-form solutions for the ZPP in two special cases:
• Naive constant variance model (NCV). This model was initially proposed by Li, Yang, and Zou (2016) and it is simply the random walk with drift:
If we use the previous results by Su and Rieger (2009) with H = 0 and a geometric Brownian motion with drift, it is straightforward to show that the 1-yead ahead ZPP can be computed at time t as follows:
where P t is the last price. Note that this formula is an approximation which is valid only in the limit with ∆t → 0 and H → 0.
• GARCH(1,1) with normal errors. If we assume that X t follows a model with a constant mean and a GARCH(1,1) with normally distributed errors,
the ZPP can be approximated as follows
where σ 2 T is sum of the forecasted variances of all shocks ε t from t + 1 till t + T , which can be shown to be 13 13 Compute the recursive forecasts of the conditional variance from time t + 1 till time t + T ; then collect all the common
whereσ 2 t+1|t can be either the forecasted variance at time t + 1 conditional on information at time t, or the unconditional variance forecast 14 , while A and B are two vectors defined below:
There is an increasing empirical literature showing that the statistical distributions of crypto-assets are far from being normally distributed, see e.g. Chu et al. (2015) , Osterrieder (2016), Chu et al. (2017) , and Osterrieder and Lorenz (2017) . Nevertheless, the previous closed-form formulas for the ZPP can provide a quick estimate of the probability of coin death and they can give an investor at least a rough idea of the crypto-asset credit risk. This is why they can be useful instruments for online data providers, who can publish the quotes of traded crypto-assets together with these market-implied PDs 15 . Note that the ZPP can highlight potential fraudulent behavior, like the famous pump-and-dump fraud that involves artificially inflating the price of a stock through various means, to later sell the purchased stock at a higher price to (un-informed) investors who lose all their money. In these cases, the ZPP tends to
show very large swings of the estimated PD in short periods of time and any investor should consider such unusual behavior as a potential red flag. See for some examples with the ZPPs of bankrupt companies which committed different forms of fraud.
Evaluation of prediction quality The main instrument used to check the forecasting performance of a model with binary data is the confusion matrix (Kohavi and Provost (1998) ). The confusion matrix for a two class classifier is reported in Table 2 . In the specific context of our analysis, the entries in the confusion matrix have the following meaning: a is the number of correct predictions that a coin is dead, b is the number of incorrect predictions that a coin is dead, c is the number of incorrect predictions that a coin is alive, while d is the number of correct predictions that a coin is alive.
The confusion matrix is then used to compute the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC or AUROC) by Metz and Kronman (1980) , Goin (1982) and Hanley and McNeil (1982) components and use the property of the geometric series. The result will be given by (4). for all forecasting models: the receiver operating characteristic curve is obtained by plotting, for any probability threshold between 0 and 1, the proportion of correctly predicted dead coins a/(a + b) on the y-axis (also known as the sensitivity or hit rate), and the proportion of alive coins predicted as dead coins c/(c + d) (also known as the false positive rate). The AUC lies between zero and one and the closer it is to one the more accurate the forecasting model is, see Sammut and Webb (2011) , pp. 869-875, and references therein for more details. We will also compute the model confidence set by Hansen et al. (2011) which was extended by Fantazzini and Maggi (2015) to binary models, to assess the prediction power of our competing models. We will employ the squared loss which is called the Brier score when applied on binary outcomes, see Brier (1950) .
Empirical analysis
We combined a collection of over 1500 coins available from coinmarketcap.com with a list of 42 dead coins from deadcoins.com, which is a trusted source of information about scams, parody, and other junk coins. Merging both datasets and taking only the coins that are traded from at least the 1st January 2016, we obtained a dataset with 149 alive and 13 dead coins. It is worth noting that dead coins still have some negligible daily trading volumes for the reasons discussed in the Introduction.
The focus of this work is to estimate the market risk and the credit risk for small and medium-sized portfolios of crypto-currencies, so that we considered the following three cases:
• estimation of the market risk measures for a portfolio of the top-5 cryptocurrencies by market capitalization;
• estimation of the market risk measures for a portfolio of 15 coins, consisting of the top-5 coins, 5 random average coins, and 5 junk cryptocurrencies;
• estimation of the credit risk measures for 42 coins, consisting of 29 alive coins and 13 dead coins 16 .
Portfolio with top-5 coins
We considered the top-5 coins by market capitalization at the time we started writing this paper in we used a rolling forecasting scheme of 522 observations and we left 200 data for the out-of-sample evaluation. We used the first differences of the data without log transformation (that is the P&L) to compute not only their market risk measures, but also their credit risk measures using the Zero Price Probability (ZPP) by . More specifically, we used a VAR(1) model for the conditional means, univariate GARCH(1,1) models for the conditional variances, and the following six multivariate distributions for the standardized errors:
• a DCC(1,1) model with multivariate normal distribution;
• a DCC(1,1) model with multivariate Student's t distribution;
• a normal copula/skewed-t GARCH model with constant correlation matrix;
• a t-copula/skewed-t GARCH model with constant correlation matrix;
• a normal copula/skewed-t GARCH model with a correlation matrix following a DCC(1,1) model;
• a t-copula/skewed-t GARCH model with a correlation matrix following a DCC(1,1) model;
We calculated the 1-day-ahead forecasts for the 1%, 2%, 3%, 4% and 5% VaR levels and for the 5% ES, for each coin and for an equally-weighted portfolio with the five coins. The actual VaR exceedances (2011), Weiss (2013) , Patton (2013) and McNeil et al. (2015) . The worse VaR results for central quantiles (4% and 5%) were expected, due to the computational problems associated with the estimation of GARCH models with small samples (≤ 500 observations), see Fantazzini (2009a) 2017) and Mensi et al. (2018) . This is why we employed a rolling estimation window of 522 observations, which is similar to the window size suggested by Hwang and Valls Pereira (2006) , who investigated the small sample properties of the maximum likelihood estimates of ARCH and GARCH models. The asymmetric
VaR losses of the competing models are rather close and almost all models are included into the MCS (for both the single coins and the portfolio case). This latter result was expected because Fantazzini (2009a) showed that, when small samples are considered and the data are skewed and leptokurtic, the biases in the GARCH parameters are so large that they deliver conservative VaR estimates, even with a simple multivariate normal distribution.
The p-values of the exceedance residuals test by McNeil and Frey (2000) and of the multilevel VaR backtest with N = 4 levels by Kratz et al. (2018) for the forecasted ES 5% are reported in 
Portfolio with 15 coins
We considered the following 15 coins with daily data ranging between June 2016 Kratz et al. (2018) again rejects the null hypothesis much more for DCC models than for copula models. In general, DCC models seem to provide worse model fits of the multivariate distribution tails compared to copula models, thus confirming recent simulation studies by Muller and Righi (2018) .
Credit risk for 42 coins
We computed the probability of death/default for a set of 42 coins reported in Table 12 , using the methods described in section 3.2.2 .
We split our dataset into a training set containing all coins up to May 2017, and a validation (out-oftime) set ranging from June 2017 till May 2018. Note that the coins which were considered dead in May 2017, were also included in the validation set because they kept on trading and they could be potentially revived, see the previous discussion in Section 3. We estimated all models using the training subset and then we computed the 1-year-ahead forecasts for the probability of death for each coin: these forecasts were used with the validation dataset to compute the AUC scores, Brier scores and the MCS. The last month trading volume, the one-year trading volume and the average yearly search volume index as provided by Google Trends were used as regressors for the logit, probit and random forest models 17 . For computing the ZPP, we employed the random walk model with the closed-formula (2), the univariate GARCH(1,1) model with normal errors and the closed-formula (3), univariate GARCH(1,1) models with student's t and skewed-t errors, DCC(1,1) models with standardized errors following either a multivariate normal or a multivariate t distribution, and Copula-GARCH models with skewed-t marginals and either a normal copula or a t-copula (both with constant and dynamic parameters). The AUC scores, the Brier score and the models included in the MCS, for both the training and the validation datasets, are reported in Table 13 .
Classical credit scoring models performed better in the training sample, whereas the models perfor- mances are much closer when the validation/out-of-time sample is considered. In the latter case, the ZPPs computed with multivariate models improved their performances in term of AUC, but they are still worse then credit scoring models. However, almost all models are included in the MCS, thus showing that there is insufficient information in the data to separate good and bad models: this outcome was expected due to the small sample size involved. Interestingly, the ZPP computed with the simple random walk with drift performed remarkably well, thus confirming the empirical evidence by Li et al. (2016) .
This result and the improved performance of the ZPP computed with multivariate models can probably be explained using again the simulation results in Fantazzini (2009a) , who showed that the biased parameters of a multivariate distribution computed with a small sample of skewed and leptokurtic data can deliver conservative VaR estimates in the left tail of the distribution: considering that the left tail of the P&L distribution is the key element to compute the ZPP, a positively biased probability may have helped these models to forecast the riskiest coins. Another reason which could have contributed to the better performance of all multivariate models in the validation sample is the different coins' dependence structure in the training and validation time samples. Figure 1 reports the heat maps of the correlation matrices for all coins in the training sample (left) and the validation sample (right): it is evident that the second sample witnessed a much stronger dependence among coins than the first sample, and we would have a similar picture if we used measures of rank correlation like the Kendall' tau and the Spearman's rho (not reported). For example, the average correlation between coins in the training sample was 0.15, whereas it was 0.32 in the validation sample. This stronger dependence may explain why multivariate models performed better than the univariate models thanks to a larger information set.
Finally, we remark that the AUCs estimated with an out-of-time validation dataset can be higher than those estimated with an in-sample dataset at a previous time, because new future data may well come from a different distribution, see Figure 1 for an explicative example. Moreover, an estimated AUC may widely differ from the true metric in a small sample. In this regard, Hanczar et al. (2010) performed an extensive simulation study with several models and cross-section training and test datasets, and they showed that "(i) for small samples the root mean square differences of the estimated and true metrics are considerable; (ii) even for large samples, there is only weak correlation between the true and estimated metrics; and (iii) generally, there is weak regression of the true metric on the estimated metric" (Hanczar et al. (2010) , p. 822). Interestingly, they found that with N = 50 the estimated AUCs may differ from the true AUC with amounts up to ±0.2: given that we worked with temporal datasets and parameterintensive models, this range may be even higher. Besides, this simulation evidence also helps to explain why the MCS included almost all models. All metrics computed by Hanczar et al. (2010) with small simulated samples showed very large variances and any model selection based on these metrics would be difficult: hence the inability of the MCS approach to distinguish between good and bad models.
Robustness checks
We wanted to verify that our previous results hold also with different portfolios and different models.
Therefore, we performed a series of robustness checks, considering a capitalization-weighted portfolio instead of an equally-weighted portfolio, and we computed the market risk measures assuming the cryptocurrencies P&L to be comonotonic.
28

Capitalization-weighted portfolios
The equally-weighted portfolio is the main benchmark of the financial industry and literature, see e.g. DeMiguel et al. (2007) and references therein. Moreover, Hu et al. (2018) and Brauneis and Mestel (2019) analyzed cryptocurrency-portfolios and showed that the simple 1/N portfolio outperforms all competing portfolio strategies. However, most investors in crypto-currencies use capitalization-weighted portfolios, where individual assets are weighted according to their total market capitalization see, for example, the monthly trading volume rankings published at coinmarketcap.com/currencies/volume/monthly.
Moreover, capitalization-weighted portfolios are important benchmarks in the financial literature, see Sharpe (1992) , Black and Litterman (1992) and Reilly and Brown (2002) . Therefore, we performed the previous back-testing analysis with capitalization-weighted portfolios considering 5 and 15 coins, (2000) does not highlight any particular misspecification for the ES 5%. T-copula based models often provide the most precise estimates and, in general, copula models tend to fare better than DCC models with large portfolios than with small portfolios.
Comonotonic assets
A set of random variables is comonotonic if they are perfectly positively dependent, which means that they are almost surely strictly increasing functions of a single random variable, see McNeil et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion at the textbook level. In this case, the Value-at-Risk and the expected shortfall are additive for a sum of comonotonic random variables, see Dhaene et al. (2006) for a proof. Therefore, portfolio risk measures can be computed using only the marginal models without the need to estimate the dependence structure (which is represented by the so-called comonotonicity copula). (2000), multilevel VaR backtest by Kratz et al. (2018) .
All estimated portfolio risk measures pass the backtesting specification tests, with the student's t GARCH marginals providing the most accurate measures, whereas the other marginal models are slightly more conservative. These results will definitely not surprise traders and financial professionals dealing with crypto-currencies, who several times repeated that the crypto-market is still a "one-man show" driven by the bitcoin price, see e.g. Mitsuru et al. (2014) , Bitconnect (2017) and DeMichele (2018).
6 Conclusions
Credit and market risks for cryptocurrencies are more interlinked than for traditional assets, and their differences are of quantitative and temporal nature, not qualitative. Credit risk for cryptocurrencies can be defined as the gains and losses on the value of a position of a cryptocurrency that is abandoned and considered dead but which can be potentially revived, while market risk can be described as the gains and losses on the value of a position (or portfolio) of alive cryptocurrencies, due to the movements in market prices in centralized and decentralized exchanges.
This paper proposed a set of models to estimate simultaneously both the market risk and the credit risk for a portfolio of crypto-currencies. Moreover, two closed-form formulas for the ZPP model in case of normally distributed errors were also developed using recent results from barrier option theory. These formulas can be useful to get a rough idea of the crypto-asset credit risk and may be interesting to online data providers, who can publish the quotes of crypto-assets together with their market-implied credit risk measures.
A backtesting exercise for market risk modelling using two datasets of 5 and 15 coins was performed.
Our results showed that the t-copula with skewed-t GARCH marginals can be a good compromise for precise VaR estimates across different quantile levels, particularly the most extreme quantiles (1% and 2%) which are the most important for regulatory purposes. However, the asymmetric VaR losses of the competing models were rather close and all models were included in the MCS for almost all coins and for the portfolio case: this result was expected because Fantazzini (2009a) showed that, when small samples are considered and the data are skewed and leptokurtic, the biases in the GARCH parameters are so large that they can deliver conservative VaR estimates, even with a simple multivariate normal distribution.
The backtesting of the expected shortfall estimates showed that DCC models often underestimated the true ES, whereas t-copula/skewed-t GARCH models were generally fine.
A backtesting exercise for credit risk modelling was performed using a dataset of 42 coins. The empirical analysis showed that classical credit scoring models performed better in the training sample, whereas the models' performances were much closer in the validation sample, with the simple ZPP computed using a random walk with drift performing remarkably well. In general, all multivariate models performed much better in the validation sample than in the training sample, thanks to the much stronger dependence shown by coins in the validation sample.
Finally, we performed a set of robustness checks to verify that our results also hold under different forecasting setups. We found out that risk estimates using capitalization-weighted portfolios are slightly more precise than those with equally-weighted portfolios, probably due to the less extreme distributions of top cryptocurrencies compared to coins with small capitalizations. Moreover, market risk measures computed assuming the cryptocurrencies P&L to be comonotonic passed all the backtesting specification tests, thus confirming financial professional literature showing that crypto-currencies are mainly driven by the bitcoin price.
The extreme volatility, skewness, kurtosis, and dependence of cryptocurrencies due to the frequent presence of structural breaks and price manipulations pose a serious challenge to any multivariate risk model. Skewed-t marginals and copulas allowing for dynamic dependence are a good starting point, but the length of the estimation window plays also an important role due to multiple breaks of different nature. In this regard, a rolling estimation window of approximately 500 observations can be considered a good compromise, considering the numerical properties of GARCH models discussed by Hwang and Valls Pereira (2006) , together with the simulation evidence reported by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) , who showed that in a regression with multiple breaks the optimal window for estimation includes all of the observations after the last break, plus a limited number of observations before this break. This setup is viable with portfolios of small sizes, but it is hardly feasible with portfolios of medium and large sizes, due to a large number of parameters involved. Moreover, the strong dependence of cryptocurrencies from the bitcoin price becomes much more complex and unstable to model with larger portfolios. In such a situation, a numerically efficient solution is to assume the assets to be comonotonic.
The number of coins that we used for backtesting is rather low, and this can be a potential limitation of our analysis. However, we want to remark that we considered only small and medium-sized portfolios to avoid additional model complexity and due to the lack of historical data for the vast majority of dead coins. The last issue is certainly a major stumbling block for fully developing models for credit risk measurement and management with crypto-assets, because the lack of these data would make any model suffer from massive selection bias: for example, in the middle of 2017, there were more than 1500 traded alive coins and almost 800 dead coins, but historical market data were available only for a few dozens dead coins. The retrieval and the analysis of such data are left as an avenue for future research. Another potential future development is the analysis of the interactions effects between market risk and credit risk for cryptocurrencies and how they change over time.
specifications able to accommodate structural breaks and extreme price volatility, but this would come at the cost of lower computational tractability and potential model over-fitting. Moreover, this solution would become quickly unfeasible in the multivariate case, due to the well-known curse of dimensionality.
Finally, we remark that credit risk modelling and the implications of having invested in dead coins have not been considered so far.
Appendix B: Multivariate time series models
We employed two multivariate models for simultaneously computing the market and credit risk measures of a portfolio of cryptocurrencies: the VAR-DCC and the VAR-Copula-GARCH models. The DCC model was originally proposed by Engle (2002) and Tse and Tsui (2002) , while copula-GARCH models were discussed in Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato (2004) , A. J. Patton (2006a) , A. J. Patton (2006b) , Fantazzini (2008) and Fantazzini (2009b) . We provide below a brief review of these two approaches, while we refer the interested reader to Bauwens, Hafner, and Laurent (2012) for a more detailed treatment at the textbook level.
These two approaches share similar building blocks for the conditional mean and the conditional variance: for the mean, a Vector Auto-Regression model (VAR) is used, while for the variance a set of GARCH models was employed. Let Y t be a vector stochastic process of dimension n × 1, then a conditional model for Y t can be expressed as follows:
where µ t is a vector of conditional means, D t = diag(σ 1,t , . . . , σ n,t ) a diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations, while z t is a vector of standardized errors with a conditional multivariate distribution H t (z 1,t , . . . , z n,t ; θ) and parameter vector θ.
The conditional means are modelled with a VAR(p) model,
while the conditional variances with GARCH(p,q) models,
Other univariate GARCH models, like the Exponential-GARCH, the Threshold-GARCH, etc. can be used. Where the VAR-DCC and the VAR-Copula-GARCH models differ is how they specify the condi-45 tional joint distribution H t .
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) models
The DCC model by Engle (2002) assumes that H t is a multivariate Normal or Student's t distribution with correlation matrix R t ,
where the n × n symmetric positive definite matrix Q t is given by:
whereQ is the n × n unconditional variance/covariance matrix of z t , θ 1,l (≥ 0) and θ 2,s (≥ 0) are scalar parameters satisfying L l=1 θ 1,l + S s=1 θ 2,s < 1 to have Q t > 0 and R t > 0. Q t is the covariance matrix of z t , so that q ii,t is not equal to 1 by construction and it is subsequently transformed into a correlation matrix by (5).
In the multivariate normal case, the total likelihood can be decomposed in two parts, so that the models for the conditional means and variances can be estimated in a first stage, while the parameters of the conditional correlation are estimated in a second stage using the parameters from the first step.
Instead, in case of a multivariate student's t distribution, the estimation should be performed either in one step (so that the shape parameter is jointly estimated for all volatility models), or in two stages: in this latter case, the first step is based on a Gaussian quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator for the conditional means and variances, while the shape parameter is estimated in a second step, as suggested by Bauwens and Laurent (2005) .
The DCC model is one of the most used models in applied finance, thanks to its computational flexibility that allows this model to be computed also with portfolios consisting of up to 100 assets (Engle and Sheppard (2001) , Bauwens, Hafner, and Laurent (2012) ). Despite known problems (Aielli (2013) , Caporin and McAleer (2013) ), it still remains an important benchmark when multivariate volatility modelling is of concern, see Bauwens, Laurent, and Rombouts (2006), Satchell and Knight (2011), Caporin and McAleer (2014) and Bali and Zhou (2016) .
Copula-VAR-GARCH models
Copula theory provides an easy way to deal with the (usually) complex multivariate modelling. Using the so-called Sklar (1959) theorem, a joint distribution can be factored into the marginals and a dependence 46 function called a copula. The joint distribution H t can be expressed as follows: z t ∼ H t (z 1,t , . . . , z n,t ; θ) ≡ C t (F 1,t (z 1 ; δ 1 ), . . . , F n,t (z n,t ; δ n ); γ)
which means that the joint distribution H t of a vector of standardized errors z t is the copula C t (·; γ) of the cumulative distribution functions of the innovation marginals F 1,t (z 1 ; δ 1 ), . . . , F n,t (z n,t , ; δ n ), where γ, δ 1 , . . . , δ n are the copula and marginal parameters, respectively. For more details about copulas, we refer the interested reader to the textbooks by Joe (1997) and Nelsen (1999) , while Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato (2004) provide a detailed discussion of copula techniques for financial applications. It follows from (6) that the log-likelihood function for the joint conditional distribution H t (·, θ) is given by
log c F 1,t (z 1 ; δ 1 ), . . . , F n,t (z n,t ; δ n ); γ +
where c is the copula density function, whereas f i are the marginal densities. The maximization of the previous log-likelihood with respect to the parameters (γ, δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) can be made in 1 step, or in several steps by partitioning of the parameter vector into separate parameters for each margin and the parameters for the copula. This multi-step procedure is known as the method of Inference Functions for Margins (IFM), see Joe (1997) for details.
It is rather straightforward to show that the previous DCC model can be represented as a special case within a more general copula framework,
where z t ∼ H t (z 1,t , . . . , z n,t ; θ), and z t ∼ H t ≡ C N ormal t (F N ormal 1,t (z 1 ; δ 1 ), . . . , F N ormal n,t (z n,t ; δ n ); R t ) see e.g. A. J. Patton (2006a) , A. J. Patton (2006b) , Fantazzini (2008) and Fantazzini (2009b) for more details.
The copula approach allows us to consider more general cases than a multivariate normal DCC model.
For example, if we consider skewed-t distributions for the marginals, like those proposed by Hansen (1994) or Fernandez and Steel (1998) , then a multivariate model allowing for marginal skewness, kurtosis and normal dependence can be expressed as follows: If we suppose that our assets have symmetric tail dependence, we can use a Student's t copula, instead,
(z 1 ; δ 1 ), . . . , F Skewed−t n,t (z n,t ; δ n ); R t , ν)
where ν denotes the degrees of freedom of the t-copula.
